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Abstract 
 
Motivated by the long-standing debate on the pros and cons of competitive devaluation, we 
propose a new perspective on how monetary and exchange rate policies can contribute to a 
country’s international competitiveness. We refocus the analysis on the implications of monetary 
stabilization for a country’s comparative advantage. We develop a two-country New-Keynesian 
model allowing for two tradable sectors in each country: while one sector is perfectly competitive, 
firms in the other sector produce differentiated goods under monopolistic competition subject to 
sunk entry costs and nominal rigidities, hence their performance is more sensitive to 
macroeconomic uncertainty. We show that, by stabilizing markups, monetary policy can foster 
the competitiveness of these firms, encouraging investment and entry in the differentiated goods 
sector, and ultimately affecting the composition of domestic output and exports. Panel regressions 
based on worldwide exports to the U.S. by sector lend empirical support to the theory. 
Constraining monetary policy with an exchange rate peg lowers a country’s share of 
differentiated goods in exports between 4 and 12 percent. 
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1.   Introduction 
This paper offers a new perspective on how monetary and exchange rate policy can 
strengthen a country’s international competitiveness. The conventional policy model 
emphasizes the competitive gains from currency devaluation, which lowers the relative cost of 
producing in a country over the time span that domestic wages and prices are sticky in local 
currency. In modern monetary theory and central bank practice, however, the resort to 
competitive devaluation is not viewed as a viable policy recommendation, as it invites 
retaliation and currency wars, and furthermore, is bound to worsen the short-run trade-offs 
between inflation and unemployment. Conversely, recent contributions to the New Open 
Economy Macro (NOEM) and New-Keynesian (NK) tradition stress that monetary 
policymakers can exploit a country’s monopoly on its terms of trade. As this typically means 
pursuing a higher international price of home goods, the implied policy goal appears to be the 
opposite of improving competitiveness.1 In this paper, we pursue a different approach, focusing 
on the implications of monetary and exchange rate regimes for a country’s comparative 
advantage.  
We motivate our analysis with the observation that monetary policy aimed at stabilizing 
marginal costs and demand conditions at an aggregate level (weakening or strengthening the 
exchange rate in response to cyclical disturbances) is likely to have asymmetric effects across 
sectors. Stabilization policy can be expected to be more consequential in industries where firms 
face higher nominal rigidities as well as significant up-front investment to enter the market and 
price products---features typically associated with differentiated manufacturing goods. To the 
extent that monetary policy ensures domestic macroeconomic stability, it creates favorable 
conditions for firms’ entry in such industries, with long-lasting effects on their competitiveness, 
and thus their weight in domestic output and exports.  
                                                 
1 In virtually all contributions to the new-open economy macroeconomics and New-Keynesian literature, 
the trade-off between output gap and exchange rate stabilization is mainly modeled emphasizing a terms-
of-trade externality (see Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2001, 2005), Canzoneri et al. 
(2005) in the NOEM literature, as well as Benigno and Benigno (2003), and Corsetti et al. (2010) in the 
New-Keynesian literature, among others). Provided the demand for exports and imports is relatively elastic, 
an appreciation of the terms of trade of manufacturing allows consumers to substitute manufacturing 
imports for domestic manufacturing goods, without appreciable effects in the marginal utility of 
consumption, while reducing the disutility of labor. The opposite is true if the trade elasticity is low. 
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To illustrate our new perspective on the subject, we specify a stochastic general-
equilibrium monetary model of open economies with incomplete specialization across two 
tradable sectors. In one sector, conventionally identified with manufacturing, firms produce an 
endogenous set of differentiated varieties operating under imperfect competition; in the other 
sector, firms produce highly substitutable, non-differentiated goods under perfect competition. 
One key distinction between these sectors is that nominal rigidities are relevant only for the 
differentiated producers, who have some monopoly power and therefore are able to set their 
product prices. A second key distinction is that establishing a differentiated product requires a 
sunk entry investment, which does not apply to nondifferentiated goods producers.  
The core result from our model is that efficient stabilization rules lower the average 
relative price of a country’s differentiated goods in terms of its nondifferentiated goods, 
conferring comparative advantage in the sale of differentiated goods both at home and abroad. 
Underlying this result is a transmission channel at the core of modern monetary literature: in 
the presence of nominal rigidities, uncertainty implies the analog of a risk premium in a firm’s 
prices, depending on the covariance of demand and marginal costs (See Obstfeld and Rogoff 
2000, Corsetti and Pesenti 2005 and more recently Fernandez-Villaverde et al. 2011). We 
show that, by affecting this covariance, and thus the variability of the ex-post markups, optimal 
monetary policy contributes to manufacturing firms setting low, competitive prices on average, 
with a positive demand externality affecting the size of the market. A larger market in turn 
strengthens the incentive for new manufacturing firms to enter, see e.g., Bergin and Corsetti 
(2008) and Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz (2008). We derive a key testable implication of the 
theory: everything else equal, countries with a reduced ability to stabilize macro shocks will 
tend to specialize away from differentiated manufacturing goods, relative to the countries that 
use their independent monetary policy to pursue inflation and output gap stabilization.  
We calibrate our model using novel estimates of the TFP process for differentiated and 
non-differentiated sectors in the US vis-à-vis an aggregate of European countries. In the 
calibrated model we find that the unconditional mean of the share of a country’s exports in 
differentiated goods falls by more than one percent, and as much as 9 percent depending on the 
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calibration, if a country replaces optimal monetary rules with a unilateral peg implying 
inefficient output gap stabilization.  
At an empirical level, we contribute novel evidence on the key prediction of the model, 
by conducting panel regressions of the composition of exports to the U.S. by country, on 
indicators for the exchange rate regime of that country. The regression model includes country 
and year fixed effects, to account for determinants of comparative advantage, as well as a 
number of controls to account for macroeconomic and financial factors that may weigh on a 
country’s exports: the real exchange rate, the current account balance, currency and banking 
crisis dummies, as well as an index of capital account liberalization.  
We find that a peg does reduce the share of differentiated goods in a country’s exports. 
This result is robust to changing the reference sample (e.g. to excluding oil exports and oil 
exporting countries), as well as to adopting alternative classifications of the exchange rate 
regime, and/or of instruments designed to control for the endogeneity of a peg. The point 
estimate of this effect is in the range between 2 and 6 percentage points. Given that the average 
differentiated goods share is around one-half, this implies an effect of 4 to 12 percent, which is 
a large effect by macroeconomic standards. We should stress here that our study is entirely 
distinct from the macroeconomic literature on the effects of exchange rate volatility on the 
volume of exports; we instead provide theoretical arguments and evidence that exchange rate 
and monetary regimes have appreciable effects on the composition of exports by types of good.  
In line with well-known contributions to the NOEM and NK literature,2 our model 
suggests that efficient stabilization affects a country’s terms of trade. The underlying 
mechanism, however, is distinct. The NOEM and NK literature appeals to a terms-of-trade 
externality and the (monetary-analog) of the optimal tariff argument. While a terms-of-trade 
externality is also present in our model, our main result actually rests on a change in the 
composition of exports. Namely, by lowering average markups in the manufacturing sector, 
                                                 
2 Our theory has implications for the analysis of cross-border policy cooperation. Namely, the impact of 
monetary policy on trade and production patterns creates welfare incentives to deviate from monetary rules 
that are efficient from a global perspective, defining a policy game over comparative advantages. While 
related to the NOEM literature studying strategic policy and coordination (see the discussion in Corsetti et al. 
2010), the mechanism producing gains from cooperation in our model is different.  
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stabilization policy fosters the production of high value-added goods. As the average supply of 
these goods rises, their share in exports increases, more than offsetting any fall in 
manufacturing prices.  From the perspective of trade theory, our analysis is related to leading 
work on tariffs by Ossa (2011), also lending theoretical support to the competitiveness 
argument. This paper, like ours, models a country’s comparative advantage drawing on the 
literature on the ‘home market effect’ after Krugman (1980), implying production relocation 
externalities associated with the expansion of manufacturing.3  
The text is structured as follows. The next section describes the model. Section 3 
derives analytical results for a simplified version of the model, and section 4 uses stochastic 
simulations to demonstrate a broader set of implications. Section 5 presents empirical evidence 
in support of the theory. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Model 
In what follows, we develop a two-country monetary model, introducing a key novel 
element in the way we specify the goods market structure. Namely, each country—home and 
foreign--- produces two types of tradable goods. The first type comes in differentiated varieties 
produced under monopolistic competition.  This is the market where firms face entry costs and 
nominal rigidities. The second type of good is produced by perfectly competitive firms, and is 
modeled according to the standard specification in real business cycle models. For this good, 
there is perfect substitutability among producers within a country (indeed, the good is produced 
under perfect competition), but imperfect substitutability across countries, as summarized by an 
Armington elasticity.  
 
                                                 
3 According to the ‘home market effect,’ the size of the market (i.e. a high demand) is a source of 
comparative advantage in manufacturing. In this literature, the social benefits from gaining comparative 
advantage in the manufacturing sector stem from a ‘production relocation externality.’ In the presence of 
such an externality, acquiring a larger share of the world production of differentiated goods produces welfare 
gains due to savings on trade costs. Our work is also related to Corsetti et al. (2007), which considers the role 
of the home market effect in a real trade model, as well as Ghironi and Melitz (2005).  We differ in modeling 
economies with two tradable sectors, as well as considering the implications of price stickiness and monetary 
policy. 
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2.1. Goods market structure   
        Households consume goods from two sectors. The D sector consists of differentiated 
varieties of manufacturing good, which are produced by n and n* monopolistically competitive 
firms in the home and foreign country, respectively (from now on, foreign variables will be 
denoted with an asterisk). Each variety in the D sector is an imperfect substitute for any other 
variety in this sector, either of home or foreign origin, with elasticity ϕ. The N sector consists 
of non-differentiated goods, produced by perfectly competitive firms. The home and foreign 
versions of the N good are imperfect substitutes for each other, with elasticity η.  For 
convenience, hereafter we may refer to the first sector as ‘manufacturing.’ 
 The overall consumption index is specified: 
Ct CD ,t CN ,t1 ,
 
where 
   
* 11 1
,
0 0
t tn n
D t t tC c h dh c f df

 
 
         
is the index over the home and foreign varieties of manufacturing good, c(h) and c(f), and  
CN ,t  
1
CH ,t
1
  1  1 CF ,t1




1
 
is the index over goods differentiated only by country of origin, with ν accounting for the 
weight on domestic goods. The corresponding consumption price index is  
   
1
, ,
11
D t N t
t
P P
P
 
 

  , (1) 
where  
       11 1* 1,D t t t t tP n p h n p f       (2) 
is the index over the prices of all varieties of home and foreign manufacturing goods, and 
     11 1 1, , 1 ,N t H t FtP P P         (3) 
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is the index over the prices of home and foreign non-differentiated goods. 
 These definitions imply relative demand functions for domestic residents: 
    , ,( ) /t t D t D tc h p h P C  (4) 
    , ,( ) /t t D t D tc f p f P C  (5) 
  , ,/D t t t D tC P C P  (6) 
   , ,1 /N t t t N tC PC P   (7) 
   , , , ,/H t H t N t N tC P P C   (8) 
    , , , ,1 /F t F t N t N tC P P C   . (9) 
 
2.2. Home household problem  
 The representative home household derives utility from consumption (C), and from 
holding real money balances (M/P); it derives disutility from labor (l). The household derives 
income by selling labor at the nominal wage rate (W); it receives real profits  t  from home 
firms as defined below, and interest income (iB) on holding domestically traded bonds, which 
are in zero net supply. It pays lump-sum taxes (T). 
 Household optimization for the home country may be written: 
0
0
max , ,t tt t
t t
ME U C l
P


     
where utility is defined by 
1 11 1ln
1 1
t
t t t
t
MU C l
P
 
 
     , 
subject to the budget constraint: 
    1 1 11t t t t t t t t t t tPC M M B i B Wl T          . 
Above, σ denotes risk aversion and ψ the inverse of the Frisch elasticity. Defining t t tPC  , 
optimization implies an intertemporal Euler equation: 
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1
t
  1 it Et 1t1



  (10) 
a labor supply condition:
 
 
 t t tW l
   (11) 
and a money demand condition: 
 
1 t
t t
t
iM
i
      . (12) 
 The problem and first order conditions for the foreign household are analogous. 
 
2.3. Home firm problem and entry condition 
 In the differentiated goods sector, production is linear in labor: 
    ,t D t ty h l h , (13) 
where l(h) is the labor employed by firm h, and D  is stochastic technology common to all 
differentiated goods producers in the country. Exports involve an iceberg trade cost, D , so that  
        *1t t D ty h d h d h   , (14) 
where   , ,( ) ( ) ( )t t AC t K td h c h d h d h    is total demand for the product in the home country, 
for use in consumption, adjustment costs, and entry costs, respectively;  *td h  is the 
corresponding demand for home goods abroad.   Firm profits are computed as: 
              * * ,/t t t t t t t t t p th p h d h e p h d h W y h AC h     . (15) 
There is free entry into the sector. To set up a firm, managers incur a one-time sunk 
cost, K , and production starts with a one-period lag. In each period, firms face an exogenous 
probability of exit  , so that fraction   of all firms exogenously stop operating each period. 
Let tn represent the number of firms, and define new entrants to the export market, tne . The 
stock of firms at each point in time is:  
   1 1t t tn n ne    . (16) 
The value function of firms that enter period t may be represented as the discounted sum of 
profits of domestic sales and export sales,   
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       
0
1
s t s
t t t s
s t
v h E h  




     .  
Firms enter until the point that a firm’s value equals the entry sunk cost. This entry cost 
includes a congestion externality, represented as an adjustment cost that is a function of the 
number of new firms.  
1
t
t
t
neK K
ne


     . 
The congestion externality plays a similar role as the adjustment cost for capital standard in 
business cycle models, which moderates the response of investment to match dynamics in data. 
We calibrate the adjustment cost to match data on the dynamics of new firm entry. We allow 
entry costs to consist of labor units or investment in differentiated goods units. The entry 
condition may be written 
       1t K t K Dt tv h W P K    , (17) 
where K =1 is the case of entry costs in labor units, and K  =0 is the case of goods units. The 
goods component of the entry cost falls on both domestically produced and imported goods, in 
similar proportion as consumption: 
      , ,( ) / 1K t t D t K t td h p h P ne K    (18) 
      , ,( ) / 1K t t D t K t td f p f P ne K   . (19) 
The home firm h sets a price p(h) in domestic currency units for domestic sales. Under 
the assumption of producer currency pricing, this implies a foreign currency price  
      * 1 /t D t tp h p h e  , (20) 
where the nominal exchange rate, e, is defined as home currency units per foreign currency unit.  
Firms face a nominal cost of adjusting prices 
         
2
1
1
2
tP
t t t
t
p h
AC h p h y h
p h


    
. (21) 
For the sake of tractability, we follow Bilbiie et al. (2008) in assuming that new entrants 
inherit from the price history of incumbents the same price adjustment cost, and so make the 
same price setting decision.  The aggregate value of the price adjustment costs is: 
9 
 
    t t tAC h n AC h . (22) 
To adjust their price, firms use final goods according to: 
    , , , ,( ) /AC t t M t AC D td h p h P D  (23) 
    , , , ,( ) /AC t t M t AC D td f p f P D  (24) 
  , , ,/A C D t t t D tD P A C P  (25) 
   , , ,1 /AC N t t t N tD P AC P   (26) 
   , , , , , ,/AC H t H t N t AC N tD P P D   (27) 
    , , , , , ,1 /AC F t F t N t AC N tD P P D   . (28) 
similar to the composition of equations (4)-(9). 
 Maximizing firm value subject to the constraints above leads to the price setting 
equation: 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 2
1 1 1
2
1 11
11 1
1 2 1
1
1
t t tt P
t t P
t t t t
t ttP
t
t t t
p h p h p hWp h p h
p h p h p h
p h p h
E
p h p h
   
 
  
 
                 
          
 (29) 
where the optimal pricing is a function of the stochastically discounted demand faced by a 
domestic differentiated goods producer: 
    
        
, , , 1 1
,
* * * *
, , , 11*
,
1
1
1 1 .
t
t D t AC D t K t t
M t
D t
D t AC D t tD K t t
M tt
p h
C D ne K
P
p h
C D ne K
e P



   

 


        
           
. 
Note that, since firms are owned by households, these receive firm profits and finance the 
creation of new firms, so the profit term in the household budget constraint may be written: 
   t t t t tn h nev h   . 
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In the second sector firms are assumed to be perfectly competitive in producing a good 
differentiated only by country of origin. The production function for the home non-
differentiated good is linear in labor:  
 , , ,H t H t H ty l , (30) 
where ,H t  is subject to shocks. It follows that the price of the homogeneous goods in the 
home market is equal to marginal costs: 
 , ,/H t t H tp W  . (31) 
An iceberg trade cost specific to the non-differentiated sector implies prices of the home good 
abroad are 
 p*H ,t  p*H ,t 1N  / et . (32) 
Analogous conditions apply to the foreign non-differentiated sector. 
 
2.4. Government 
 The model abstracts from public consumption expenditure, so that the government uses 
seigniorage revenues and taxes to finance transfers, assumed to be lump sum. The home 
government faces the budget constraint:  
 M t M t1Tt  0. (33) 
In the home country, monetary authorities are assumed to pursue an independent monetary 
policy, approximated by the following Taylor rule: 
      11 1
p Y
t t
t
t
p h Yi i
p h Y
 

             
. (34) 
In this rule, inflation is defined in terms of differentiated goods producer prices, while Y is a 
measure of output defined as: 
      ,
0
/
tn
t t t H t H t tY p h y h dh p y P
      .  
In running the model, we will use either the above or a narrower definition of output, including 
only manufacturing. Given our calibration of the Taylor rule, with a high coefficient on 
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inflation, this will be immaterial for our results. In the foreign country, monetary authorities are 
assumed to pursue either a Taylor rule similar to (34) or, alternatively, an exchange rate peg: 
  te e . (35) 
 
2.5. Market clearing  
 The market clearing condition for the manufacturing goods market is given in equation 
(14) above.  Market clearing for the non-differentiated goods market requires: 
   * *, , , , , , ,1H t H t AC H t N H t AC H ty C D C D      (36) 
   * * *, , , , , , ,1F t F t AC F t N F t AC F ty C D C D     . (37) 
Labor market clearing requires: 
   ,
0
tn
t H t K t t tl h dh l ne K l   . (38) 
Bond market clearing requires: 
 Bt  0. (39) 
Under the assumption of no international trade in assets, international trade in goods must be 
balanced period by period: 
 
                 
   
*
* * * *
, ,
0 0
* * *
, , , , 0.
ttn n
t Kt AC tt t t Kt AC t
Ht Ht AC H t Ft Ft AC F t
p h c h d h d h dh p f c f d f d f df
P C D P C D
    
    
   (40) 
 
2.6. Shocks process and equilibrium definition  
 The productivity shocks follow the joint log normal distribution: 
 
1
* ** *
1
1
1
log log log log
log log log log
log log log log
log log log log
Dt D Dt D
Dt D Dt D
t
Ht H Ht H
Ft F Ft F
   
       
   




                             
 
With the covariance matrix 't tE     .   
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A competitive equilibrium for the world economy presented above is defined along 
the usual lines, as a set of processes for quantities and prices in the Home and Foreign 
country satisfying: (i) the household and firms optimality conditions; (ii) the market clearing 
conditions for each good and asset, including money; (iii) the resource constraints—whose 
specification can be easily derived from the above and is omitted to save space. 
 
2.7. Relative price and export share measures 
Along with the real exchange rate ( * /t t te P P ), we report two alternative measures of 
international prices. First, as is common practice in the production of statistics on international 
relative prices, we compute the terms of trade weighting goods with their respective 
expenditure shares: 
 TOTSt 
Ht p(h)t  1Ht  pH ,t
Ftet p*( f )t  1Ft et p*F ,t , (41) 
where the weight Ht  measures the share of differentiated goods in the home country’s overall 
exports: 
 
      
        
* * * *
,1
* * * * * * *
, , ,1
( )
( )
t t Kt AC tt
Ht
t Kt AC t Ht Ht AC H tt t
p h n c h d h d h
p h n c h d h d h P C D
 

      , (41a) 
and Ft measures the counterpart for the foreign country:
 
      
        
*
1 ,
*
1 , , ,
( )
( )
t t t Kt AC t
Ft
t t t Kt AC t Ft Ft AC F t
p f n c f d f d f
p f n c f d f d f P C D
 

      . (41b) 
Since the share of differentiated goods in a country’s overall exports is readily available in data, 
we will report values for Ht  and Ft generated in our simulations, as they provide a useful 
means for comparing model implications to data. Following the trade literature, we also 
compute the terms of trade as the ratio of ex-factory prices set by home firms relative to foreign 
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firms in the manufacturing sector:  *( ) / ( )t t t tTOTM p h e p f .4  The latter measure ignores the 
non-differentiated good sector.  
  
3. Analytical Insights from a Simple Version of the Model 
The main goal of this section is to clarify the mechanism by which macroeconomic 
uncertainty about demand and marginal costs impinges on pricing by differentiated good 
manufactures, ultimately determining the country’s comparative advantage in the sector. To 
pursue this goal, we will work out a simplified version of the model that is amenable to 
analytical results. Despite a number of assumptions needed to make the model tractable, we 
will be able to derive key predictions that remain valid in our full-fledged version of the model. 
 We specialize our model as follows. First, we posit that manufacturing firms operate 
for one period only (implying  in the entry condition), and symmetrically preset prices 
over the same horizon. Entry costs are in labor units,  i.e., K  = 1, as this facilitates analytical 
solution of our model. Second, we simplify the non-differentiated good by setting its trade 
costs to zero ( 0N  ) and let the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods 
approach infinity (   ). This implies that the sector produces a homogeneous good, an 
assumption frequently made in the trade literature.5 Third, productivity shocks are i.i.d., and 
only occur in the differentiated good sector (we abstract from productivity shocks in the non-
differentiated good sector). Fourth, utility is log in consumption and linear in leisure ( 0  ). 
Finally, drawing on the NOEM literature (see Corsetti and Pesenti 2005, and Bergin and 
Corsetti 2008), we carry out our analysis of stabilization policy by defining a country’s 
monetary stance as PC  , under the control of monetary authorities via their ability to set the 
interest rate. Following this approach, we therefore study monetary policy in terms of   (and 
*  for the foreign country), instead of the interest rate rule (34). 
                                                 
4 This is the same definition used in Ossa (2011), though in our case it does not imply the terms of trade are 
constant at unity, because monetary policy does affect factory prices.  See also Helpman and Krugman 
(1989), and Campolmi et al. (2014). 
5 Different from the trade literature, however, we do treat this sector as an integral part of the (general) 
equilibrium allocation, e.g., exports/imports of the homogeneous good sector enters the terms of trade of 
the country. 
 1
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 Under these assumptions, the firms’ problem becomes 
max
pt1 h   Et 
 t
 t1
 t1 h 


. 
where t t tPC  . The optimal preset price in the domestic market is: 
    
1
1
1
1
11
t
t t
t
t
t t
WE
p h
E







         , (42) 
where 1 1 1 1t t t tW        is the firm’s marginal costs, that is, the ratio of nominal wages to 
labor productivity. In this simplified model setting, the stochastically discounted value of future 
demand facing the firm for its good in both markets, 1t , becomes: 
      *1 1 1 11t t t tc h c h        .6 
The home entry condition is a function of price setting and the exchange rate: 
    11 1 1
1
t t
t t t t
t
K E p h p h  

  

         
. (43) 
 Provided that the price setting rules can be expressed as functions of the exogenous 
shocks and the monetary stance, the home and foreign equilibrium entry conditions along with 
the exchange rate solution above comprise a three equation system in the three variables: e, n 
and n*. This system admits analytical solutions for several configurations of the policy rules.   
 Before proceeding, it is worth noting two properties of our simplified version of the 
model. First, both economies produce the same homogeneous good with identical technology 
under perfect competition, and this good is traded costlessly across borders. Hence, with 
arbitrage ensuring that *Dt t DtP e P , the exchange rate can be expressed as: 
 et  pDtpDt*
 Wt
Wt
*
 PtCt
Pt
*Ct
*
  t t*
, (44) 
                                                 
6 Upon appropriate substitutions and cancellations, equation (42) may also be written with 1t  defined as 
     1 11 11 11 * * 1 1 * * 11 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1t tt t t t t t t t tn p h n p f e n p h n p f e                            . 
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where we have used the labor supply condition (11) imposing linear preferences in leisure 
( 0  ). Given symmetric technology in labor input only, the law of one price implies that 
nominal wages are equalized (once expressed in a common currency) across the border. By the 
equilibrium condition in the labor market with an infinite labor supply elasticity, then, the 
exchange rate is a function of the ratio of nominal consumption demands, hence of monetary 
policy stances. 
 Second, per effect of nominal wage equalization (due to trade in a single homogenous 
good whose production is not subject to shocks), production risk in our simplified economy is 
efficiently shared, even in the absence of trade in financial assets, and independently of the way 
production and trade are specified in the other sector. Equation (44) clearly can be rewritten as 
the standard perfect risk sharing condition: 
*
* .
t t t
t
t t
e P Crer
P C
   
Home consumption rises relative to foreign consumption only in those states of the world in 
which its relative price (i.e. the real exchange rate) is weak.  
   
3.1. The equilibrium consequences of nominal rigidities  
 To gain insight into the transmission mechanism underlying our results, we rewrite (42) 
as follows: 
                        
   
1
1
11
1
1 11 '
t
t t
tt
t t
t t t
WCov
Wp h E
E

 




 
                       
                           (42’) 
By the covariance term on the right-hand side of this expression, the optimal preset pricing 
depends on the comovements of a firm’s marginal costs ( 1 1 1 1t t t tW       ), and overall 
world demand for the firm’s good, 1t . Since both marginal costs and overall demand are 
functions of monetary stances, policy rules critically impinge on pricing (and thus on entry) via 
their effects on the covariance term. To wit: assume no monetary stabilization, i.e., posit that 
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the monetary stance is constant in either country ( * 1t t   ), implying a constant nominal 
exchange rate at */ 1t t te    . Since, with i.i.d. shocks, there are no dynamics in 
predetermined variables such as prices and numbers of firms, the optimal preset prices (42’) 
simplify to  
 1
1
1
1
no stab
t t
t
p h E  
     
   * 1 *
1
1
1
no stab
t t
t
p f E  
      , 
that is, prices are equal to the expected marginal costs (coinciding with the inverse of 
productivity) augmented by the equilibrium markup. Most critically, under a constant monetary 
stance, these optimal pricing decisions do not depend on the term Ω’ (hence do not vary with 
trade costs and firms entry), as they do in the general case. The number of firms can be 
computed by substituting these prices into the entry condition (43), so to obtain: 
*
1 1
no stab no stab
t tn n q

   . 
 Intuitively, for given monetary stances, there is no change in the exchange rate. With 
preset prices, a shock to productivity will have no effect on the terms of trade, the real 
exchange rate and consumption demands, hence no change in the level of production in either 
type of good. With no monetary response, an i.i.d. shock raising productivity in the home 
manufacturing sector necessarily leads to a fall in the level of employment in the same sector 
(not compensated by a change in employment in the other sectors of the economy). Firms end 
up producing at low marginal costs and thus suboptimally high markups, since nominal 
rigidities prevent firms from re-pricing and scaling down production. Conversely, given 
nominal prices and demand, a drop in productivity will cause firms to produce too much at 
high marginal costs, hence at suboptimally low markups.  
So, in a regime of no monetary stabilization, firms face random realization of 
inefficiently high and inefficiently low levels of production and markup. When presetting 
prices, managers maximize the value of their firm by trading off higher markups in the low 
productivity state, with lower markups in the high productivity states. In our model above, they 
weigh more the risk of producing too much at high marginal costs: it is easy to see that preset 
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prices are increasing in the variance of productivity shocks (by Jensen’s inequality, 
Et
1
 t1




1
Et  t1 
1).7 The implications of this result for our argument are detailed next. 
 
3.2. Prices and firm dynamics under efficient and inefficient stabilization of output gaps 
 Since the model posits that the homogenous good sector operates under perfect 
competition and flexible prices, there is no trade-off in stabilizing output across different 
sectors. It is therefore possible to replicate the flex-price allocation under the following simple 
monetary policy rule: the monetary stance in each country moves in proportion to productivity 
in the differentiated good sector:  t  t ,  t*  t* . The exchange rate in this case is not 
constant, but contingent on productivity differentials. Namely, the home currency depreciates 
in response to an asymmetric rise in home productivity: 
*
t
t
t
e  . 
The active monetary policy just described affects optimal pricing by firms. By ensuring that 
the nominal marginal costs μ/α remain constant, the above policy ensures that the covariance 
term in (see (42’)) is zero, thus insulating the ex-post markup charged by home 
manufacturing firms from uncertainty about productivity.8 Note that, to the extent that 
monetary policy stabilizes marginal costs completely, it also stabilizes markups at their flex-
price equilibrium level. It follows that the price firms preset is lower than in an economy with 
no stabilization:  
                                                 
7 As discussed in Corsetti and Pesenti (2005) and Bergin and Corsetti (2008) in a closed economy context, 
given nominal demand, high preset prices allow firms to contain overproduction when low productivity 
squeezes markups, rebalancing demand across states of nature. High average markups, in turn, exacerbate 
monopolistic distortions and tend to reduce demand, production and employment on average, discouraging 
entry. 
8 As is well understood, the policy works as follows: in response to an incipient fall in domestic marginal 
costs domestic demand and a real depreciation boost foreign demand for domestic product. As nominal 
wages rise with aggregate demand, marginal costs are completely stabilized at a higher level of production. 
Vice versa, by curbing domestic demand and appreciating the currency when marginal costs are rising, 
monetary policy can prevent overheating, driving down demand and nominal wages. Again, marginal costs 
are completely stabilized as a result. 
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   1 1
1
1
1 1
stab no stab
t t t
t
p h p h E     
        
. 
In a multi-sector context, a key effect of monetary stabilization is that of reducing a country’s 
differentiated goods’ price in terms of domestic nondifferentiated goods, redirecting demand 
across sectors. This rise in demand for differentiated goods supports the entry of additional 
manufacturing firms. As shown in the appendix, the number of manufacturing firms is:9 
nt1
stab  
q Et
2  t1 *t






1
1 1  1 1  1 1
1  t1 *t






1
1 1  1 1  1 1   t1 *t1






2(1 )






 
the same as under flexible prices. The above generalizes to our setup a familiar result of the 
classical NOEM literature (without entry) assuming that prices are sticky in the currency of the 
producers (Corsetti and Pesenti (2001, 2005) and Devereux and Engel (2003), among others): 
despite nominal rigidities, policymakers are able to stabilize the output gap relative to the 
natural-rate, flex-price allocation. 
The analysis of a peg provides a further key insight on our model, and yields a key 
testable implication. Consider the case in which the home government fully stabilizes its output 
gap, while the foreign country maintains its exchange rate fixed against the home currency:  
* and 1,  so that t t t t t te        .10 
Under the policy scenario just described, the optimally preset prices of domestically and 
foreign produced differentiated goods are, respectively:  
 1 1tp h

   ,        * 11 * 11 tt t tp f E
 
 

 
      . 
                                                 
9 As discussed in the appendix, it is not possible to determine analytically whether symmetric stabilization 
policies raise the number of firms compared to the no stabilization case. Model simulations suggest that 
there is no positive effect for log utility, and a small positive effect for CES utility with a higher elasticity 
of substitution. Nonetheless, we are able to provide below an analytical demonstration of asymmetric 
stabilization, which is our main objective.  
10 A related exercise consists of assuming that the foreign country keeps its money growth constant 
( * 1t  ) while home carries out its stabilization policy as above. 
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While the home policy makers manage to stabilize the markup of manufacturing firms 
completely, the foreign firms producing under the peg regime face stochastic marginal 
costs/markups driven by shocks to productivity, both domestically and abroad. With i.i.d. 
shocks, preset prices will be increasing in the term Et(1/α*t+1), as in the no stabilization case. 
The equilibrium number of firms n and n* instead solve the following two-equation 
system: 
* *
1 1 1 1
1 1
t t t t
q
n An n Bn

     
 
* *
1 11 1t tt t
A B q
n An n Bn

    
 
where 
  A  Et  t1 *t1












1
1 1 , B  Et  t1 *t1












1
1 1.
 
While it is not possible to solve for the number of firms in closed form, the system above does 
allow one to prove that 
n>nflex > n* 
(the proof is given in the appendix). Other things equal, the constraint on macroeconomic 
stabilization implied by a currency peg tends to reduce the size of the manufacturing sector in 
the foreign country: there are fewer firms, each charging a higher price. The home country’s 
manufacturing sector correspondingly expands.  In other words, the country pegging its 
currency tends to specialize in the homogeneous good sector.   
To fix ideas: insofar as a peg results in higher markups and exacerbates monopolistic 
distortions in the foreign manufacturing sector, inefficient stabilization redirects demand 
towards the (now relatively cheaper) non-differentiated good sector. Most crucially, as the ratio 
of the country’s differentiated goods prices to nondifferentiated goods prices rises compared to 
the home country, the foreign comparative advantage in the sector weakens: domestic demand 
shifts towards differentiated imports from the home country. Because of higher monopolistic 
distortions and the higher trade costs in imports of differentiated goods, foreign consumption 
falls overall (in line with the predictions from the closed economy one-sector counterpart of our 
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model, e.g., Bergin and Corsetti 2008). All these effects combined reduce the incentive for 
foreign firms to enter in the differentiated good sector. The country’s loss of competitiveness is 
mirrored by a trend appreciation of its welfare-relevant real exchange rate, mainly due to the 
fall in varieties available to the consumers. But real appreciation is actually associated with 
weaker, not stronger, terms of trade. Weaker terms of trade follow from the change in the 
composition of foreign production and exports, with more weight attached to low value added 
non-differentiated goods.  
The consequences of a foreign peg on the home economy are specular. The home 
country experiences a surge of world demand for its differentiated good production, while 
stronger terms of trade boost domestic consumption. More firms enter the manufacturing sector, 
leading to a shift in the composition of its production and exports in favor of this sector.  
As a result, with a foreign country passively pegging its currency, there are extra 
benefits for the home country from being able to pursue stabilization policies. The home 
manufacturing sector expands driven by higher home demand overall, and fills part of the gap 
in manufacturing production no longer supplied by foreign firms. At the same time, the shifting 
pattern of specialization ensures that the home demand for the homogeneous good is satisfied 
via additional imports from the foreign country. 
 
4. Numerical simulations 
 In this section, we evaluate the quantitative implications of our full model, by 
conducting stochastic simulations. Despite the many differences between the simplified and the 
full version of our model, we will show that key results from the former continue to hold in the 
latter. Namely, in our general specification it will still be true that, if the foreign country moves 
from efficient stabilization to a peg, while the home country sticks to efficient stabilization 
rules, (a) the foreign average markups in manufacturing will tend to increase and (b) there will 
be production relocation---firm entry in the foreign country will fall on average, while entry in 
the home country will rise on average. Correspondingly, average consumption will rise at home 
relative to foreign. We will also show that this relocation will be associated with an average 
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improvement in the home terms of trade (while the home welfare-relevant real exchange rate 
depreciates).  
We first discuss our calibration of the model, then present our main results. 
 
4.1. Parameter values 
Parameter values are chosen to be consistent with an annual frequency, to match the 
frequency of the data available for sectoral productivity. We set time preferences at 0.96  ; 
risk aversion at 2  ; labor supply elasticity at 1/ 1.9  , from Hall (2009).   
The price stickiness parameter is set at p  8.7 , a modest value which in a Calvo 
setting would correspond to half of firms resetting price on impact of a shock, with 75 percent 
resetting their price after one year.11  The death rate is set at 0.1  , which is four times the 
standard rate of 0.025 to reflect the annual frequency. The sunk cost of entry is normalized to 
the value 1. 
To choose parameters for the differentiated and non-differentiated sectors we draw on 
Rauch (1999). We choose   so that differentiated goods represent 57 percent of U.S. trade in 
value.12 The home share of non-differentiated goods is set at 0.5  , which implies a trade 
share of about 30%, given the trade costs and elasticities below. To set the elasticities of 
substitution for the differentiated and non-differentiated goods we draw on the estimates by 
Broda and Weinstein (2006), classified by sectors based on Rauch (1999). The Broda and 
                                                 
11 As is well understood, a log-linearized Calvo price-setting model implies stochastic difference equation 
for inflation of the form 1t t t tE mc     , where mc is the firm’s real marginal cost of production, and  
where    1 1 /q q q    , with q is the constant probability that  firm must keep its price unchanged in 
any given period. The Rotemberg adjustment cost model used here gives a similar log-linearized difference 
equation for inflation, but with  1 /    . Under our parameterization, a Calvo probability of q = 0.5 
implies an adjustment cost parameter of 8.7 . This computation is confirmed by a stochastic simulation 
of a permanent shock raising home differentiated goods productivity without international spillovers, which 
implies that price adjusts 50% of the way to its long run value immediately on impact of the shock, and 75% 
at one period (year in our case) after the shock.  
12 Values vary by year and by whether a conservative or liberal aggregation is used. Taking an average over 
the three sample years and the two aggregation methods reported in Table 2 of Rauch (1999) produces an 
average of 0.57.  Replicating this value in our steady state requires a calibration of the consumption share at 
 =0.38, which compensates for the fact that trade for investment purposes (sunk cost) involves 
differentiated goods only. 
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Weinstein (2006) estimate of the elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods 
varieties is  =5.2 (the sample period is 1972-1988). The corresponding elasticity of 
substitution for nondifferentiated commodities is  = 15.3. 
 To set trade costs, we need to think beyond costs associated with just transportation. 
These are often thought to be higher for commodities than for high value differentiated goods. 
As Rauch (1999) points out, differentiated goods involve search and matching costs, whereas 
commodities and goods traded on an organized exchange with a published reference price 
avoid such costs. Estimates are available for the tariff equivalent of language costs, with a 
value of 11% in Hummels (1999) or 6% in Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), so we use 8% 
in between.  Since Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) recommend a calibration of total trade costs at 
16%, our calibration implies that half of this is due to language and matching costs, and the 
other half due to transportation. This implies a calibration of D = 0.16 for differentiated goods, 
and N =0.08 for non-differentiated goods.   
 The parameters in the home monetary policy rule are determined by the values that 
maximize home utility. As typically found, the optimal weight on inflation is the maximum 
value considered in the grid search ( P =1000), and the optimal value on output is Y =0. The 
foreign country is assumed to peg its exchange rate at parity with the home country: e=1. 
 To our knowledge, no one else has calibrated a DSGE model with sectoral shocks 
distinct to differentiated and nondifferentiated goods. Annual time series of sectoral 
productivities are available from the Groningen Growth and Development Centre (GGDC), for 
the period 1980-2007. Data for the U.S. is used to parameterize shocks to the home country, 
and an aggregate of the EU 10 for the foreign country.13 TFP is calculated on a value-added 
basis.  For each country, the differentiated goods sector comprises total manufacturing 
excluding wood, chemical, minerals, and basic metals; the non-differentiated goods sector 
comprises agriculture, mining, and subcategories of manufacturing excluded from the 
differentiated sector. To calculate the weight of each subsector within the differentiated (or 
                                                 
13 These EU 10 countries are AUT, BEL, DNK, ESP, FIN, FRA, GER, ITA, NLD and the 
UK. See http://www.euklems.net/euk08i.shtml. 
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non-differentiated) sector, we use the 1995 gross value added (at current prices) of each 
subsector divided by the total value added for the differentiated (or non-differentiated) sector. 
After taking logs of the weighted series, we de-trend each series using the HP filter. Parameters 
ߩ and Ω, reported in Table 1, are obtained from running a VAR(1) on the four de-trended 
series. 
 The benchmark simulation model specifies entry costs in units of goods ( K =0), as 
Cavallari (2013) shows this is important for matching international business cycle moments in 
a sticky price model. We will also report results for entry costs in labor units in our sensitivity 
analysis. The adjustment cost parameter for new firm entry,  , is chosen to match the standard 
deviation of new firm entry in the benchmark simulation to that in data. Time-series for firm 
entry is limited. The World Bank’s Entrepreneurship Survey and data base provides a count of 
new businesses registered during a calendar year, for the period 2004 to 2012 for selected 
countries. We use the data available for France, Germany, Italy and the U.K. to represent the 
foreign country in our model. Data for the U.S. on establishment entry are available from the 
Longitudinal Business Database. Standard deviations for logged and HP-filtered series are 
reported as ratios to the standard deviation of GDP for the same period: the value for the U.S. is 
5.53, and the European average is 3.01. A value of  = 0.25 in the simulation model, with the 
remaining parameters and shocks as described above, generates standard deviations of new 
firm entry close to these values. (See Table 2b.) 
  
4.2. Simulation results 
 This section first illustrates the properties of the model, looking at the impulse 
responses generated by fluctuations in manufacturing productivity. It then discusses results for 
the unconditional means of variables, drawn from stochastic simulations of a second order 
approximation of the model. 
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4.2.1. Impulse responses 
Consider the dynamics of the benchmark model in response to a one standard deviation 
positive shock to productivity in the differentiated goods sector of the home country, where 
both countries employ efficient stabilization policy. Results are shown in Figure 1, which plots 
the percentage deviation from the unconditional mean of key variables of interest.  As home 
policymakers fully stabilize the markup, they react to the shock by expanding domestic demand 
and depreciating the exchange rate. This policy reaction boosts production in the differentiated 
sector, in line with its enhanced productivity. The number of firms in the sector rises, and 
production shifts in favor of home differentiated goods, away from nondifferentiated goods. In 
the foreign country, the shift in production pattern partly reflects the cross-country 
autocorrelation of shocks in the calibration. Since the foreign country also experiences a rise in 
differentiated goods productivity, the number of firms and the volume of differentiated output 
also rise in this country, though by a smaller magnitude than at home where the shock 
originated, and with a one period lag.  
To further clarify the role of the cross-country correlation of shocks, in Figure 2 we 
simplify the analysis by setting the cross-country elements of the shock autorcorrelation matrix 
equal to zero. This figure thus shows the effects of a rise in the differentiated goods 
productivity at home that remains asymmetric. Foreign production of differentiated goods falls 
(while it rises at home); conversely foreign production of nondifferentiated goods rises (while 
it falls at home).  
The case of asymmetric policies---with the foreign country pegging its exchange rate, 
and the home country employing efficient stabilization policy---is shown in the next two 
figures. In response to a favorable shock to home differentiated-goods productivity, the 
behavior of home variables in Figure 3 is very similar to Figure 1. But in Figure 3, the response 
of the foreign variables closely resembles those of the home variables. The commitment to 
exchange rate stability causes the foreign monetary authorities to expand money supply and 
demand by more, in step with the home country, providing extra stimulus to the foreign 
differentiated goods sector at the expense of the nondifferentiated goods sector.  
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Figure 4 shows the effects of a productivity shock to the differentiated goods sector in 
the country pursuing a peg (that is, foreign). It differs noticeably from the other figures. In the 
absence of a stabilizing policy response, manufacturing entry in the foreign economy, while 
positive, is an order of magnitude smaller compared to entry in the home economy in the 
previous figures. Likewise, the rise in foreign production of differentiated goods is much 
smaller and much shorter lived. 
 
4.2.2. Unconditional means 
 Table 2a reports the unconditional means of key variables obtained from stochastic 
simulations of a second order approximation of the benchmark model, and Table 2b reports 
standard deviations. In Column (1) of Table 2a both countries use stabilization policy, while in 
column (2) the foreign country adopts an exchange rate peg. Column (3) reports the percent 
change between the previous columns, hence accounting for changes when the foreign country 
pursues a peg instead of inflation stabilization. Note that country means in column (1) are not 
completely symmetric despite symmetric policies, due to the cross-border differences in the 
estimated shock process.  
The simulation results fully confirm the main analytical insights from the previous 
section. First and foremost, when the foreign country pegs, average production of the 
differentiated good shifts away from the foreign country and toward the home country; the 
foreign country instead has higher production of the non-differentiated good. This shift in 
production is reflected in a 0.73 percent fall in the number of foreign differentiated goods firms, 
in contrast to a 0.63 percent rise at home. This implies that the ratio of foreign firm number 
relative to the home counterpart falls 1.4 percent. The share of differentiated goods in exports 
( F ) falls by 0.56 percent in the foreign country, while the share in the home country ( H ) 
rises by 0.61 percent. This implies that the ratio of the foreign export share relative to the home 
counterpart falls 1.2 percent. 
Second, also consistent with the transmission mechanism discussed in the previous 
section, what drives the foreign loss in the differentiated goods market share under a peg is the 
higher average markup charged by foreign producers of these goods. Note that the foreign price 
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of differentiated goods rises relative to both wages and non-differentiated goods (.07 percent in 
both cases). 
Finally, when the foreign policymaker abandons efficient stabilization policy for a peg, 
the foreign terms of trade including the homogenous good, TOTS, actually worsen (.38 percent). 
This stands in contrast with the movements in the (conventionally-defined) terms of trade 
including only differentiated goods, TOTM, which remains nearly unchanged (.01 percent). 
The contrasting behavior of the TOTS and TOTM is due to a composition effect: the shift in 
foreign export share away from differentiated goods means these more expensive goods receive 
a smaller weight in the average price of foreign exports and a larger weight in the average price 
of foreign imports.  
International price adjustment highlights a notable difference between the simplified 
and the full model. As our results in Table 2a emphasize, despite a lower markup, the terms of 
trade of manufacturing do not necessarily fall with better stabilization. This will be so because, 
in the full model, a high level of entry tends to raise production costs, as wages respond to a 
higher demand for domestic labor. To the extent that labor supply is not infinitely elastic (as 
assumed in the simplified model), this effect may become strong enough to prevent the 
international price of domestic manufacturing from falling in tandem with average markup in 
the sector.  
Table 2b shows that the calibration of our model is in line with the volatility of output 
in the US and the EU-10 countries, as well as the volatilities of key variables (in ratio to the 
volatility of output), such as consumption, employment and net business formation. 
 
4.2.3. Alternative model specifications 
 Table 3 summarizes the range of results for unconditional means that are possible under 
alternative model specifications. To save space, we only report the percentage change in 
number of firms and percent change in differentiated export share when the foreign country 
switches from inflation stabilization to exchange rate peg, by country as well as accumulated 
across countries. The first column repeats for comparison the key result for the benchmark case 
from Table 2a. This result depends completely upon free entry of firms, as Column (2) 
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indicates that the changes in differentiated export share disappear when the number of firms is 
held fixed exogenously. We conclude that the endogenous shift in number of firms between 
countries is essential for the change in monetary policy to translate into quantitatively 
meaningful effects on export shares. 
The version of price stickiness, whether in units of the producer or local currency, is 
not consequential to the effect of policy on product specialization.  When the price adjustment 
specification of the benchmark model is replaced by the local currency version, results are 
nearly unchanged, as reported column (3).  (See the appendix for the LCP version of 
Rotemberg pricing for this case.) Even if prices are inelastic to the exchange rate in the short 
run, they are ex-ante sensitive to the covariance of marginal costs and demand, which is the 
core mechanism by which monetary stabilization impinges on competitiveness.  
Stickiness in wage adjustment, in contrast, can significantly magnify the effects of 
monetary policy on product specialization. Suppose households supply differentiated labor, 
indexed by j, and face a cost of adjusting wages         2, 1 12wW s s s sAC j W j W j l j    
 and face a labor demand      Lt t t tl j W j W l . Utility maximization now implies a wage 
setting condition to replace the labor supply condition in the benchmark model:  
   
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(as well as including in the labor market clearing condition the labor expended in adjusting the 
wage). Barattieri et al. (2014) estimate the average time to reset a wage is between 3.8 and 4.7 
quarters. To match this finding we apply the logic employed above for the sticky price 
calibration, and compute that a value of w = 32.3 in our annual model implies that half of 
wages have been reset one year after a shock. The substitutability between labor varieties is 
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set to L =6. The parameterization of the monetary policy rule is adjusted to p  = 3 to permit 
model solution.14  
 Sticky wages significantly amplify the effect of a peg on the steady state number of 
firms and export shares, lowering the foreign/home ratios by 4.7% and 3.4%, respectively. 
Some intuition can be draw from equation (42’) derived for the case of the simplified model. 
Recall that differentiated goods prices are set lower, hence encouraging greater specialization 
in differentiated goods, if there is a smaller covariance of nominal marginal costs (wage 
divided by productivity) with demand. Firms dislike a situation where they are required to 
produce more when production costs are high. In the benchmark simulation with only price 
stickiness, monetary policy assures that demand is high during positive productivity shocks that 
lower production costs. But this policy also has the effect of raising nominal wages, which 
works the opposite direction to raise production costs.   Sticky wages work to prevent such a 
rise in wage costs, and hence maintain a low covariance of costs with demand.15   
 Another key determinant of the rise in wage and hence costs following a shock is the 
labor supply elasticity. Recall that the preferences assumed in the analytical model imply an 
infinite labor supply elasticity, in contrast with the value of 1.9 assumed in the numerical 
economy. There is a wide range of values for this elasticity supported in the macroeconomics 
literature.16 When the labor supply elasticity is raised in the simulation model to an extreme 
value of 5, we obtain a stronger effect of a peg on the mean export share, but the difference is 
modest (see column 5).  
However, the effect becomes dramatic when this calibration is combined with a change 
in the specification of preferences to remove the wealth effect on labor supply, as in a GHH 
                                                 
14 No solution is possible in the model when significant wage rigidity is combined with a monetary policy 
that tries to hold prices nearly constant.  Because prices depend primarily upon the production cost, that is, 
the ratio of wage to the productivity, a shock to productivity requires a similar movement in wage if prices 
are to remain constant.  We resolve this problem by reducing the weight on inflation in the monetary policy 
rule, using a value of 3 based on Schmidt-Grohe and Uribe (2007). 
15 Implications of policy for the mean level of sticky wages have little impact on comparative advantage in 
our model, since, in contrast with sticky prices, the wage rate affects both sectors symmetrically.   
16 See for Example Keane and Rogerson (2012). 
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specification. Let preferences be defined:       11 1 1 lnt t t t tU C l M P       , 
which implies a labor supply t t tl W P
   and a redefinition of   1 1t t t tP C l     . 
 The effect of a peg on the number of firms and the differentiated export share is 
amplified by an order of magnitude compared to the benchmark model, as seen in column (6). 
The mechanism is similar to that for the sticky wage case. The preference specification 
removes the wealth effect in wage determination, in that consumption does not appear in the 
labor supply condition. Unlike the benchmark model, a rise in consumption induced by a rise in 
productivity does not reduce labor supply and require a rise in wage to induce workers to 
supply labor. Hence there is less pressure for wage to rise for a given rise in production, which 
serves to lower the covariance between costs and output.17  
For completeness, we consider a case where entry costs are specified in labor units ( K
=1), as assumed in the analytical model. The effect of stabilization policy on the mean level of 
wages now has strong implications for the mean level of entry. Recall from the benchmark case 
in Table (2a) that a stabilizing country has a higher mean wage compared to the nonstabilizing 
country. When entry cost is specified in labor units this can strongly dampen entry in the 
stabilization country, and as a result, we find that policy has a trivial effect on the mean level of 
firm entry under the benchmark preference specification (not reported in Table 3). Column (7) 
reports a modified simulation where this rise in mean wage is moderated by assuming the 
preferences used for the preceding column (6). Stabilization policy then has a significant effect 
to raise entry and export share, albeit still less than in the case with entry costs specified in 
goods units. 
 In addition to wage movements, another feature of the benchmark model that could 
limit the effect of a peg is the correlation of exogenous shocks across countries. The fairly high 
shock correlations in the benchmark calibration reflect the close relationship between the U.S. 
and the EU-10 countries in the data used for calibration. But this high correlation might not 
                                                 
17 We also investigated a version of the model with complementarity between consumption and labor, as 
advocated in Hall and Milgrom (2008). While this specification did dampen the rise in wage during a rise 
in output and hence raise the mean share of differentiated goods in exports, the effect was small, and this 
case is not reported in our table of results.  
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apply to many other, especially developing, countries. Column (8) of Table 3 shows that if the 
calibration assumes zero contemporaneous correlations across all shocks, the effect of the peg 
on entry and export shares doubles compared to the benchmark calibration. 
 Finally, as a complement to productivity shocks, we study a fiscal shock.18 Letting DtT  
represent the fraction of differentiated good production that is surrendered to the government, 
the differentiated goods market clearing condition becomes: 
         *1 1Dt t D tT y h d h d h    . Similarly for a tax on nondifferentiated goods 
production, NtT , market clearing becomes      * *, , , , , , ,1 1Nt H t H t AC H t N H t AC H tT y C D C D      . 
It is assumed that the goods surrendered to the government as tax payments are consumed 
directly by the government, and this yields no household utility. This implies pricing equations 
for the two types of goods: 
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and   , , 1
t
H t
H t Nt
Wp
T  . 
Note that from the firm perspective this tax shock is very similar to a negative productivity 
shock. The tax shocks are assumed to follow autoregressive processes in log deviations from 
steady state, where the calibration of the shock is taken from the estimations of Leeper et al. 
(2010).19 
 Results reported in column (9) of Table 3 show that this simple tax shock acts much 
like a productivity shock. The addition of this new shock essentially doubles the effect of 
                                                 
18 We also studied the effects of shocks to tastes, both intertemporally and between sectors, as well as 
money supply and money demand shocks. These shocks did not have significant implications for the steady 
state share of allocation of production between sectors.  
19 The process estimated by Leeper et al (2010) for capital tax shocks is converted from a quarterly 
frequency to an annual frequency by stochastic simulation of the process and then fitting an annual 
sampling of the artificial data to a first order autoregression. The resulting autoregressive parameter of 
0.741 and standard deviation of shocks of 0.0790 are applied to tax shocks in each country and each sector. 
These shocks are assumed to be orthogonal to each other. The mean level of this tax, 0.184, is also taken 
from Leeper et al (2010).  
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monetary stabilization on the mean number of firms and the share of differentiated goods in 
exports, as compared to the case in column (1) with productivity shocks alone.  
 
5. Empirical evidence 
 In this section, we investigate if there is any empirical support for the idea that 
monetary policy can actually affect long-run competitiveness. In particular, we carry out an 
empirical analysis of the key testable implication of the model: countries with monetary policy 
targeting domestic macro (inflation and output gap) stabilization should have (everything else 
equal) greater specialization of production and export in differentiated products, relative to 
countries with a constrained monetary policy. The empirical strategy consists of taking the U.S. 
as the base country, and calculating the share of differentiated goods in total exports by country, 
for the period 1972-2004. Using this share as our dependent variable, we then run panel 
regressions on a proxy for a country’s monetary regime, including country and year fixed 
effects as well as a number of controls.   
To identify countries pursuing efficient domestic stabilization, we distinguish countries 
with or without monetary policy independence, relying on available classifications of either 
exchange rate or monetary regimes. Namely, we proxy lack of independence by the adoption of 
a pegged exchange rate regime. 
 Before proceeding, it is worth clarifying that our empirical strategy is not inconsistent 
with the fact that a country’s monetary regime is an endogenous policy choice. A country 
choice to embrace a peg, rather than a float, or adopt an inflation targeting regime, rather than 
other strategies, can always be regarded as deriving from the maximization of some social 
welfare function. For our empirical strategy to be sound, we need that such a choice is not 
specifically driven by changes in the composition of exports. As further discussed below, the 
fact that policy strategies are endogenously chosen, if anything, can be expected to smooth out 
differences across exchange rates and monetary regimes in the data---hence making it more 
difficult for us to find statistically significant results.  
We should also stress from the start that the inclusion of a country fixed effect in the 
regression specification controls for different (time-invariant) determinants of comparative 
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advantage, other than monetary policy. A country fixed effect also addresses specific 
endogeneity issues, arising when time-invariant characteristics of a country determine the 
composition of exports and at the same time motivate the choice of a particular exchange rate 
regime (say, an oil rich country pegging the national currency to the dollar over the entire 
sample period). Nonetheless, there may be issues that cannot be addressed with the inclusion of 
a country fixed effect. We will resort to splitting the sample according to specific country or 
product type characteristics, and conduct IV estimations. Finally, a year fixed effect is required 
to deal with the fact that the share of differentiated goods exports trends upward, especially in 
the first part of our sample period. 
 
5.1. Data construction and description 
 For the classification of exchange rate regimes, we rely on two sources. The 
International Monetary Fund produces a classification based upon the observed degree of 
exchange rate flexibility and the existence of formal or informal commitments to exchange rate 
paths. The definition of peg includes countries with no separate legal tender, currency board 
arrangements, exchange rate bands, or crawling pegs; this excludes countries classified as 
managed floating and independent floating. We will also consider the classification system of 
Shambaugh (2004), which identifies a peg if a country sets its interest rates following 
systematically the policy decision in some base country. One advantage of this classification is 
that it focuses on monetary independence rather than exchange rate regime per se. For example, 
in this classification, Germany in years prior to the euro is classified as retaining monetary 
independence despite participating in different regimes of fixed exchange rates in Europe, 
because it consistently acted as the leader within pegging blocks. By the same token, countries 
where capital controls insulated domestic monetary policy from global market pressure are also 
classified as having monetary independence---e.g., China is classified as having monetary 
independence in much of the sample. Note that, for our purposes, the exchange rate 
classification needs not be defined relative to the country we use as base country in the 
regression analysis (U.S.). A European country in the euro area has effectively limited or no 
monetary independence, even if the euro is floating against the dollar. 
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To identify exports of differentiated goods, we rely on Rauch (1999), which provides a 
classification of 4-digit SITC industries in terms of the degree of differentiation among 
products.  Some products are traded on organized exchanges, while some others have reference 
prices published in trade journals. Those products for which neither is true are classified as 
differentiated. Roughly 58% of the industries fall into the differentiated category.  
Trade data come from the World Trade Flows Database (see Feenstra, et al., 2005).  
Exports to the U.S. (in dollars) are available disaggregated by country and by four-digit 
industry, on an annual basis for the period 1972-2004. 
 The set of countries covered both by the trade data and exchange rate classification 
number 164. The sample years are determined by the availability of U.S. disaggregated import 
data, covering the period 1972-2004. 
 
5.2. Empirical specification 
 Our dependent variable is the share of differentiated goods in exports. Let xijt  denote 
the dollar value of exports in industry i from country j to the U.S. in year t. Let DIF take the 
value of 1 for a differentiated industry and 0 otherwise.  For country j in year t, we define a 
measure of the share of differentiated goods in the overall exports of a country to the U.S.: 
SDIFjt 
DIFi  xijti
xijti . 
The index takes values on the continuous interval between 0 and 1. In some of our experiments 
we will restrict attention to manufacturing exports only. In this case, we will only consider xijt if 
belonging to a SITC sector with a code starting with 5 through 8.  
Our regression specification is 
 0 1 2 ,jt jt jt jt jtSDIF PEG X          (32) 
where X is a vector of additional variables that we may include in the analysis as additional 
controls, and χ are country and year fixed effects. PEG takes the value of 1 for a fixed 
exchange rate and 0 otherwise. Across all our regressions, standard errors are clustered by 
country.  
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 Note that the country fixed effect controls for standard determinants of comparative 
advantage, such as factor endowments and institutions that do not vary over the sample period. 
Among the controls, we nonetheless include macroeconomic variables that may have an effect on 
the composition of trade above and beyond the mechanism highlighted by our model, such as the 
current account (CA_GDP), and dates of currency (CRISIS_C) or banking crises (CRISIS_B). 
Access to credit and exposure to credit conditions may in fact vary across industries, in part 
reflecting the type of markets in which they operate. We also include the real exchange rate level 
(RER), as an additional control for the effects on exports of large swings in international prices. 
Finally, we include a measure of financial openness (CLOSED).20  
 
5.3. Regression results 
 The model predicts 1 0  : the share of a country’s exports in differentiated goods is 
lower in countries pursuing a fixed exchange rate policy.  Results from the regression model are 
shown in Table 4 (without controls) and Table 6 (with controls). By the point estimate shown in 
column 1 of Table 4, when a country adopts a peg, the share of its exports in differentiated goods 
falls by about 6 percentage points. Given that for the typical country differentiated goods account 
for about half of its exports, the estimated coefficient implies that the export share drops by about 
12% of its value. The result is robust to using the alternative classification of exchange rate 
regime by Shambaugh (2004), which allows for monetary independence in some countries with a 
fixed exchange rate, due to capital controls or because they are the leader of a pegging block. 
 A concern with endogeneity is raised by the possibility that countries that discover oil 
or other commodities in their territory may choose to peg their currencies to the dollar because 
these commodities are priced in U.S. dollars. In this case, a peg regime would be the 
consequence, rather that the cause, of a change in the composition of production and exports 
away from differentiated goods. One way to address this potential issue consists of excluding 
OPEC members and other large oil exporters from the data set (column 2) and excluding fuel 
                                                 
20 The dates of currency and banking crises are provided by Reinhart and Rogoff (2013) and Reinhart 
(2010). The measure of financial openness is supplied by Chinn and Ito, see 
bhttp://web.pdx.edu/~ito/Chinn-Ito_website.htm. 
35 
 
from the set of export industries (SITC categories beginning with 3, see column 6). In either 
exercise, the estimations continue to support our theoretical result. We also show below that the 
result is robust to instrumenting for endogenous choice of exchange rate regime.  
A related source of concern is that poor countries may simultaneously produce mostly 
non-differentiated goods, and adopt some form of currency peg. Although the country fixed 
effect takes care of cross-sectional differences, we further check for robustness by limiting the 
sample to more developed countries, with cutoffs in per-capita income of $1035, $4085 and 
$12,615, according to the World Bank classification.21 As shown in columns 3 and 4, our 
results are almost unchanged when we exclude poor countries below the first cutoff point, and 
also when we limit the sample to upper middle and high income countries above the second 
cutoff. The only case for which the result is not statistically significant is when we limit the 
sample to only the richest countries. Nonetheless, we find that this last result also becomes 
significant if we allow some dynamics in the specification to better account for the effects of 
monetary regimes, as described below.  
Table 5 introduces a lagged PEG regressor, with the goal of accounting for the delayed 
effects of a switch in monetary regimes. In every case, the PEG has a statistically significant 
negative effect on the export share, either contemporaneously or with a lag, or both. This 
includes the subset of rich countries, for which the contemporaneous effects is zero (as found in 
the previous table), but the lagged effect is significantly negative. Still, the magnitude of the 
coefficient does appear to be smaller than for the other samples, suggesting that good monetary 
stabilization policy has a stronger effect in middle-income countries (where non-monetary 
institutions and policies may be less developed) than in rich countries, in terms of promoting 
export competitiveness in differentiated goods.     
Results are robust to specifications including controls, shown in Table 6. The exchange 
rate regime remains significant when we control for a number of factors that may impinge on 
exports, including financial conditions, external deficit, financial openness, and the real 
exchange rate.  
                                                 
21 This is the World Bank income classification by GNI per capita As of 1 July  
Source: http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications. 
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To deal with potential sources of endogeneity (not taken care of by the country fixed 
effect, and other than the oil discoveries, discussed above), we instrument for the exchange rate 
regime choice with the variable proposed by Klein and Shambaugh (2006). This consists of the 
share of neighboring countries that also peg their currency to the same base country.  The logic 
is that if, for instance, France pegs its currency to the U.S. dollar, in doing so it might be 
motivated by the goal of stabilizing its currency to its neighbor Germany, which also pegs to 
the dollar. To the degree that these regional ties dictate the choice of the exchange rate regime, 
one can conclude that a French peg to the dollar is not endogenously driven by its trade 
relationship with the U.S., nor, more importantly, by the composition of its trade with the U.S. 
For consistency, we run our IV estimation adopting the classification of the peg regime by 
Shambaugh (2004), as in the last column of Table 4. The results, shown in Table 7, continue to 
support our claim, with a statistically significant negative coefficient on the peg term. The table 
also shows that our main results are robust to using another instrument, the lagged exchange 
rate regime dummy, which is also widely adopted in the literature. For consistency and to 
verify robustness of our result, in this case the table reports estimation based on the exchange 
rate classification regime by the IMF.  
In assessing the above results, we should stress that the exchange rate regime provides 
only an imperfect proxy for the extent to which monetary policy falls short of stabilizing the 
domestic economy. By way of example, one could argue that a peg may be a good stabilization 
strategy depending on the type of shock. According to a standard argument, in the presence of 
financial shocks, a credible strategy of fixed exchange rate could ensure better stabilization 
than a float. Moreover, capital controls may relax the external financial constraints on monetary 
policy even under regimes of limited exchange rate flexibility. While these considerations are 
well-grounded, we observe that they both work against our hypothesis: other things equal, they 
tend to smooth out differences between a peg and a floating regime, in terms of their 
implications for competitiveness. In other words, if the estimation is confounded by such forms 
of endogeneity, our estimates would underestimate the importance of efficient domestic 
stabilization policy on competitiveness, biasing our results towards zero. 
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6. Conclusion 
According to a widespread view in policy and academic circles, monetary and 
exchange rate policy has the power to benefit or hinder the competitiveness of the domestic 
manufacturing sector. However, the guidance the academic literature offers to this question is 
of limited practical relevance. The conventional policy model emphasizes the competitive gains 
from currency devaluation, which lowers the relative cost of producing in a country over the 
time span that domestic wages and prices are sticky in local currency. In modern monetary 
theory and central bank practice, however, the resort to competitive devaluation is not viewed 
as a viable policy recommendation, as it invites retaliation and currency wars, and furthermore, 
such discretionary policy worsens the short-run trade-offs between inflation and unemployment. 
Conversely, recent contributions to the New Open Macro Macroeconomics and new-Keynesian 
tradition stress that monetary policy can exploit a country’s monopoly on its terms of trade. As 
this typically means pursuing a higher international price of home goods, the implied policy 
goal appears to be the opposite of improving competitiveness.  
This paper revisits the received wisdom on this issue, exploring a new direction for 
open-economy monetary models and empirical research. Our argument is that macroeconomic 
stabilization affects the comparative advantage of a country in producing goods with the 
characteristics (high upfront investment, monopoly power and nominal frictions) typical of 
manufacturing. A stabilization regime that reduces output gap (and marginal cost) uncertainty 
can strengthen a country’s comparative advantage in the production of these goods, beyond the 
short run.  
To be clear, an effective stabilization policy requires contingent expansion and 
contractions in response to shocks affecting the output gap, which ex post foster (or reduce) the 
international price competitiveness of a country. But such a policy regime by no means would 
aim to gain short-run gains by opportunistic exchange rate policy---exchange rate movements 
would be an implication of efficient domestic stabilization. In this sense, our results suggest 
that monetary stabilization affects the long-run comparative advantage of a country in a way that is 
completely separate from the competitive devaluations familiar from traditional policy models. By 
the same token, our analysis marks a key departure from a well-known conclusion of recent New 
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Keynesian models, that monetary policy should trade off output gap stabilization with stronger 
terms of trade. In our model, efficient stabilization makes differentiated good manufacturing more 
competitive, at home and abroad. But is also results in  a shift in the sectoral allocation of resources 
and composition of exports, in favor of manufacturing. Because of this shift, a larger weight of 
high-value added goods in exports improves the country overall stronger terms of trade.  
Overall, the theory developed in this paper, and the empirical evidence produced in support 
of its key implications, point to new promising directions for integrating trade and macro models 
and bring the literature closer to addressing core concerns in the policy debate. 
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Appendix: 
 
1. Entry condition: 
 
The single-period version of the entry condition (17) is: 
 1
1
t
t t t
t
W K E h  
     . 
Combine with the single-period version of the profit function (15), in which the dynamic 
adjustment cost (ACp,t(h)) is set to zero, and simplify: 
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Under producer currency pricing of exports: 
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Using demand equations for CM and c(h), as well as definition of PM: 
        *1 11 1 1 *1 11 1 * *
, 1 11 1 , 1 1
/
1 tt t tt t t tt t t t
M t M tt t M t M t
p h p h eW P PW K E p h C C
P P P P
 
    
 
    
 
    
                                       
        
11 * 1
1 1 1 1 1 11
1 1 11 * 1 * * 1 * *1 1 1 1 11 1 1
( ) ( )
1 ( ) ( )
t t t t t tt t
t t t t
t t t t t tt t t
n p h n p f P CWW K E p h p h
e n p h n p f P C
 

   
   
 
     
          
                     
Under log utility, where t tW   and t t tPC  , this becomes equation (43). 
 
 
2. Entry under full stabilization 
Substitute prices,       * 11 1ttp h p f     ,  and policy rules ( * *,     ) into (43) 
and simplify: 
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Impose symmetry across countries: 
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Which is the same as for the flexible price case. 
 
To compare to the no stabilization case, write this as 
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Note that 1 1 1 if 1
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*
11 tt    to a convex function near the symmetric steady state value of * 11 1tt    . Hence 
we cannot apply Jensen’s inequality to determine whether 1 1t tE   . This finding reflects the 
fact that the effects of symmetric stabilization are small. Our analysis, nonetheless, will show 
that the effects of asymmetric stabilization can be large. 
 
3. Case of fixed exchange rate rule:  
Substitute prices and policy rules (
*
*, (so 1)e        ) into (43): 
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Pass through expectations and simplify 
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Do the same for the foreign entry condition: 
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Rewrite the home and foreign conditions as fractions: 
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Where we define: 
  
Equating across countries: 
 
 
  
Note that the denominator will be negative provided the standard deviation of shocks is small 
relative to the iceberg costs, which will be true for all our cases: 
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For shocks independently log normally distributed with standard deviation   so that
. For example, with =0.1 and  =6,   must be less than 0.209. Our 
calibration of   is 0.017.   
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For independent log normal distributions of productivity: 
   
We can conclude that n>n*. 
 
 
4. LCP version of price adjustment costs 
 
Under the specification that prices for domestic sales,  tp h , and exports,  *tp h , are 
set separately in the currencies of the buyers, the Rotemberg price setting equations for our 
model become: 
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where , , ,H s M s M sP D
   and * * *, ,, M s M sH s P D  . 
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Table 1. Benchmark Parameter Values 
 
Preferences 
 Risk aversion 2   
 Time preference  =0.96 
 Labor supply elasticity 1/ 1.9   
 Differentiated goods share 0.38   
 Non-differentiated goods home bias 0.5   
 Differentiated goods elasticity   = 5.2 
 Non-differentiated elasticity  15.3 
 
Technology 
 Death rate 0.1   
 Price stickiness 8.7   
 Differentiated good trade cost D =0.16 
 Non-differentiated good trade cost N =0.08 
 Firm entry adjustment cost 0.25   
 
Shocks:  
0.6665 0.6145 0.1328 0.2064
0.3724 0.0447 0.0360 0.0250
0.5194 1.6747 0.1289 0.6588
0.2646 0.4435 0.0474 0.4407

          
 
 
'
5.11 4 1.68 4 9.25 5 3.45 5
1.68 4 1.45 4 1.82 5 6.47 5
9.25 5 1.82 5 6.76 4 7.50 5
3.45 5 6.47 5 7.50 5 1.70 4
t t
e e e e
e e e e
E
e e e e
e e e e
 
                       
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Table 2a: Unconditional Means under Alternative Policies 
 symmetric 
stabilization 
foreign fixed 
exchange rate 
% difference 
n 1.967 1.980 0.63 
n* 1.951 1.936 -0.73 
H  0.573 0.576 0.61 
F  0.569 0.566 -0.56 
ym 0.469 0.472 0.68 
yd 0.606 0.604 -0.34 
ym* 0.466 0.464 -0.58 
yd* 0.608 0.612 0.53 
c 0.982 0.982 0.00 
c* 0.981 0.981 -0.03 
p(h) 1.186 1.193 0.60 
p*(f) 1.267 1.192 -5.91 
w 0.959 0.964 0.60 
w* 1.024 0.963 -5.91 
p(h)/w 1.239 1.239 0.00 
p*(f)/w* 1.238 1.239 0.07 
p(h)/pdh 1.239 1.239 0.00 
p*(f)/pdf* 1.238 1.239 0.07 
rer 1.000 1.000 0.01 
TOT-Man 1.001 1.001 0.01 
TOT-total 1.000 1.002 0.38 
Results come from a stochastic simulation of a second-order approximation to the model. 
H represents the share of differentiated goods in overall exports of the home country, and it 
is computed 
      
        
* * * *
,1
* * * * * * *
, , ,1
( )
( )
t t Kt AC tt
Ht
t Kt AC t Ht Ht AC H tt t
p h n c h d h d h
p h n c h d h d h P C D
 

      ; 
Ft  represents the counterpart for the foreign country. 
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Table 2b: Standard deviations (percent)
data 
symmetric 
stabilization peg 
GDP (U.S.) 2.07 2.62 2.51 
GDP*(EU-10) 1.61 1.50 1.83 
As ratios to std. dev. of GDP: 
ne 5.46 4.10 4.34 
ne* 3.48 3.65 4.52 
c 0.75 0.43 0.45 
c* 0.88 0.40 0.34 
l 0.87 0.40 0.45 
l* 0.96 0.44 0.68 
 
U.S. data are used for home country; an average of the EU-10 for foreign. 
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Table 3: Summary of implications of alternative model specifications for key variables 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
bench-
mark 
no 
entry LCP 
sticky 
wage 
high 
labor 
elasticity 
GHH & 
high 
elasticity
labor 
entry 
costs 
uncor-
related 
shocks 
tax 
shocks 
n 0.63 0.00 0.49 2.55 0.68 6.12 0.23 1.27 1.07 
n* -0.73 0.00 -0.77 -2.14 -0.76 -7.36 -0.41 -1.45 -1.53 
n*-n -1.36 0.00 -1.25 -4.69 -1.44 -13.48 -0.64 -2.73 -2.60 
diffshare 0.61 0.05 0.60 1.58 0.64 4.54 0.32 1.22 1.18 
diffshare* -0.56 -0.02 -0.54 -1.77 -0.60 -4.78 -0.37 -1.09 -0.88 
diffshare*-diffshare -1.17 -0.06 -1.14 -3.35 -1.24 -9.32 -0.69 -2.31 -2.06 
 
Table reports the percent change in a variable when the foreign country replaces inflation stabilization with exchange 
rate peg.  Table also reports the difference between the home and foreign percent changes. 
H represents the share of differentiated goods in overall exports of the home country, and it is computed 
      
        
* * * *
,1
* * * * * * *
, , ,1
( )
( )
t t Kt AC tt
Ht
t Kt AC t Ht Ht AC H tt t
p h n c h d h d h
p h n c h d h d h P C D
 

      ; 
F  represents the counterpart for the foreign country. 
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Table 4: Baseline Regression 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Benchmark
Non-oil 
exporting 
countries 
Exclude Low 
Income 
High & 
Upper 
Middle 
Income 
High 
Income & 
Non-oil 
No Energy 
Goods 
Shambaugh 
Peg 
PEG -0.0585*** -0.0635*** -0.0632*** -0.0642*** -0.0234 -0.0487*** -0.0367** 
(0.0163) (0.0166) (0.0169) (0.0195) (0.0191) (0.0164) (0.0162) 
Obs. 3646 3256 2942 2094 953 3645 4757 
R-sq 0.741 0.725 0.786 0.816 0.818 0.712 0.718 
adj. R-sq 0.728 0.710 0.774 0.805 0.803 0.696 0.706 
Country Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Notes: DIF not included as regressor because subsumed in fixed effects. 
Standard errors (clustered by country) in parentheses: 
* significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; ***significance at 1% 
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Table 5: Baseline Regression with Lagged Peg 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Benchmark 
Non-oil 
exporting 
countries 
Exclude 
Low Income 
High & 
Upper 
Middle 
Income 
High Income 
& Non-oil 
No Energy 
Goods 
Shambaugh 
Peg 
PEG -0.0270* -0.0228* -0.0292* -0.0476** 0.0000 -0.0179 -0.0177 
(0.0158) (0.0136) (0.0176) (0.0212) (0.0140) (0.0146) (0.0127) 
L.PEG -0.0360** -0.0488*** -0.0422*** -0.0188 -0.0253* -0.0345* -0.0257** 
(0.0154) (0.0157) (0.0156) (0.0145) (0.0130) (0.0181) (0.0124) 
Obs. 3481 3113 2809 1997 911 3480 4580 
R-sq 0.747 0.731 0.791 0.822 0.820 0.722 0.727 
adj. R-sq 0.733 0.715 0.779 0.810 0.805 0.706 0.715 
Country Fixed 
Effect yes yes yes yes Yes yes yes 
Year Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes Yes yes yes 
Notes: DIF not included as regressor because subsumed in fixed effects. 
Standard errors (clustered by country) in parentheses: 
* significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; ***significance at 1% 
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Table 6: Baseline Regressions with Controls 
(1) (2) 
  
benchmark 5 year averages 
PEG -0.0528*** -0.0465** 
(0.0186) (0.0221) 
CA_GDP 0.000337 0.00101 
(0.000619) (0.00181) 
RER 0.00855 0.0182* 
(0.0122) (0.0101) 
CRISIS_C 0.00646 0.0154 
(0.0111) (0.0210) 
CRISIS_B 0.00521 0.0126 
(0.0154) (0.0249) 
CLOSED -0.0185 -0.00285 
(0.0261) (0.0329) 
Obs. 2523 646 
R-sq 0.785 0.853 
adj. R-sq 0.769 0.804 
Country and Year 
Fixed Effects yes yes 
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Table 7: IV Regressions 
  IV: Lagged IMF Exchange Rate IV: Klein-Shambaugh Index 
  
PEG -0.0739*** -0.0739*** -0.108*** -0.108*** 
(0.0206) (0.0104) (0.0273) (0.0133) 
          
Obs. 3481 3481 3443 3443 
R-sq 0.183 0.183 0.165 0.165 
adj. R-sq 0.137 0.137 0.120 0.120 
Standard Errors Clustered Robust Clustered Robust 
Country Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes 
Year Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes 
Notes: DIF not included as regressor because subsumed in fixed effects. 
If the instrument is Klein and Shambaugh, the instrumented variable is the Shambaugh peg; 
If the instrument is the lagged IMF exchange rate index, the instrumented is the contemporaneous IMF exchange 
rate index. 
Under "IV: Klein-Shambaugh Index": 
Standard errors (either clustered by country or heteroskedasticity-robust) in parentheses: 
* significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; ***significance at 1% 
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Fig 1. 
Responses to a 1 std dev rise in home manufacturing productivity;  
both countries use efficient stabilization monetary policy 
 
Vertical axis is percent deviation (0.01=1%) from steady state levels. Horizontal axis is time (in 
years). 
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Fig 2. 
Responses to a 1 std dev rise in home manufacturing productivity;  
both countries use efficient stabilization monetary policy; 
No autocorrelation in shocks across countries 
 
 
Vertical axis is percent deviation (0.01=1%) from steady state levels. Horizontal axis is time (in 
years). 
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Fig 3: 
Responses to a 1 std dev rise in home manufacturing productivity; 
foreign country pegs 
 
 
Vertical axis is percent deviation (0.01=1%) from steady state levels. Horizontal axis is time (in 
years). 
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Fig 4. 
Responses to a 1 std dev rise in foreign manufacturing productivity;  
foreign country pegs 
 
 
Vertical axis is percent deviation (0.01=1%) from steady state levels. Horizontal axis is time (in 
years). 
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